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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 10-4462 
__________ 
 
SHARON MCGUIGAN, 
 
       Appellant, 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY. 
 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvnia 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-01129) 
District Judge: Hon. Petrese B. Tucker 
 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2011 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,
*
 Int’l Trade Judge. 
 
(Filed: June 21, 2011) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
 
                                                 
* 
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, 
sitting by designation. 
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Sharon McGuigan appeals from the order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting her employer’s motion for summary 
judgment in her action alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 (2010), and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2010). We will affirm the District Court’s order. 
I. 
Because the parties are familiar with the events that gave rise to this appeal, we set 
forth only the facts necessary to explain our disposition. On May 17, 2006, Andrew 
Zuckerman, the Field Director of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Philadelphia 
branch, chose Frank DelSignore for the position of Supervisory Management and 
Program Analyst (“SMPA”) over McGuigan. At the time of selection, DelSignore was 
under the age of 40 and McGuigan was 47. DelSignore was a level two manager with 
one-and-a-half to two years of experience at that position. McGuigan had been working 
for four to five years as a program analyst for the team that the selected SMPA would 
supervise. A program analyst is not a management position. Before being a program 
analyst, McGuigan had eight years of first level management experience and four years 
of second level management experience. There were no specific written criteria created 
for the SMPA position, which is a first level management position.  
Charles Felthaus, direct supervisor of the SMPA, selected two female 
interviewers, Joann Brown and Marjorie Gallagher, to sit with him on the interview 
panel. All interviewers were over 40 years of age. At the time of selection, Brown was 
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the direct supervisor of DelSignore. Brown and her husband are personal friends of 
DelSignore. One of the department managers raised concerns about having Brown on the 
panel, but Felthaus decided to keep her on the panel because both Brown and Gallagher 
would be working directly with the selectee. Felthaus previously had selected McGuigan 
for two positions that directly reported to him and gave her outstanding evaluations for 
both. 
The interviewers agreed that DelSignore was a better candidate than McGuigan 
because he was more forward thinking and adaptable to change. They unanimously 
recommended DelSignore to Andrew Zuckerman, who was the selecting official. He 
chose DelSignore over McGuigan and gave the following reasons for his choice: (1) the 
interview panel unanimously recommended DelSignore; (2) his package was ranked one 
point higher than McGuigan’s; (3) at the time of selection he was working two levels 
above McGuigan in a position that supervised seven to nine managers; (4) at that time 
McGuigan was not working in a managment position; and (5) McGuigan’s management 
experience had been several years in the past. Zuckerman was also over the age of 40 at 
the time of selection.  
On March 11, 2009, McGuigan filed a complaint against the IRS alleging age and 
gender discrimination. On August 9, 2010, the IRS moved for summary judgment. On 
September 24, 2010, the District Court granted the IRS’s motion for summary judgment. 
McGuigan timely appealed.  
II. 
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan 
Mortg. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). In reviewing a 
district court’s decision, we assess the record using the same summary judgment standard 
that guides the district court. See id. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the 
moving party must demonstrate “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (2010) (amended Dec. 1, 2010). A factual dispute is “genuine” and thus 
warrants trial “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A court 
reviewing a summary judgment motion must evaluate the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s 
favor.” EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).  
III. 
McGuigan contends that her failure to be promoted was the product of gender and 
age discrimination. The framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 
U.S. 792, 802 (1979), applies to both causes of action. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-254 (1981) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
gender discrimination); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(reaffirming the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework to age discrimination). 
Under this framework, a plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
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evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Sorba v. Pa. 
Drilling Co., 821 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1987). To establish a prima facie case for gender 
discrimination an employee must show that (1) she applied and was qualified for the 
vacant position, and (2) she was rejected under circumstances that give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. To establish a prima facie 
case for age discrimination, an employee must show that (1) she is 40 years of age or 
older, (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her, (3) she was 
qualified for the position in question, and (4) she was ultimately replaced by another 
employee who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of discriminatory animus. 
Allentown, 589 F.3d at 689. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, 
the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Should the 
defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the reasons offered by the defendant were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.  
We will assume without deciding that McGuigan established a prima facie case 
because the District Court’s ruling rests on (and the IRS does not contend otherwise) its 
finding that McGuigan failed to show pretext. McGuigan’s major argument is that her 
employer’s reasons for choosing DelSignore were suspect, because they were a pretext 
for unlawful discrimination. 
To survive summary judgment, McGuigan was required to provide evidence 
suggesting that the employer’s proffered reasons were a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Allentown, 589 F.3d at 690. She failed to 
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do so. What she did offer was: (1) Andrew Zuckerman’s description of her managing 
experience as “old and cold”; (2) the interview panel member Joann Brown was a 
personal friend of DelSignore; and (3) DelSignore’s old position was “back-filled,” 
suggesting that the application and interview process had no bearing on his selection. We 
are not convinced. Zuckerman did not use the words “old or cold” to describe 
McGuigan’s age or gender but rather to describe her management experience, which was 
several years in the past. Evidence that DelSignore was friends with Brown, or that his 
previous position was filled before he was selected for the SMPA, does not trump the 
neutral reasons offered by Zuckerman and the interview panel. At bottom, all the 
evidence provided by McGuigan, evaluated in the light most favorable to her, does not 
establish that Zuckerman’s reasons for choosing DelSignore were a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of age or gender.  
We therefore agree with the District Court that McGuigan did not provide 
evidence that would permit a jury to conclude that she was discriminated against because 
of her age or gender. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of the IRS. 
* * * * * 
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no 
further discussion is necessary. 
 The judgment of the District Court will be AFFIRMED. 
 
 
